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The purpose of this reply brief is not to

repeat the arguments made in appellant's brief, but the purpose
is to reply to the arguments made by respondent in her brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PROXIMATE
CAUSE
OF
THE
LOSS
SUSTAINED
RESPONDENT WAS THE SUB-SURFACE WATER.

BY

Respondent, in her brief, cites at length the law of
proximate causation as stated in Couch on Insurance, 2d.

The

general rule, as stated in Couch, §74:696 requires respondent "to
establish that liability within the coverage of her limited risk

homeowner's insurance policy) her loss must result from an act,
operation covered by the policy, it must be the proximate result
thereof and unless it is, there is no liability."
In

Graham

vs.

Public

Employees

Mutual

Insurance

Company, 656 P.2d 1077, 1080-1081 (Wash. 1983), the Supreme Court
of Washington stated the general rules, proximate causation when
it held:
"We have defined proximate cause as the cause
which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces
the event, and without which that event would not
have occurred.
Where the peril specifically
insured against sets other causes in motion which,
in an unbroken sequence and connection between the
act and the final loss, produced the result for
which recovery is sought, the insured peril is
regarded as the proximate cause of the entire
loss.
It is the efficient or predominant cause which
sets into motion the chain of events producing the
loss which is regarded as the proximate loss, not
necessarily the last act in the chain of events."
(citations omitted) Id. at 1080-1081";
The general rule is again stated in 43 Am Jur 2d,
Insurance, §463:
"The general rule of insurance law is that only
the proximate cause of loss, and not the remote
cause is to be regarded in determining whether
recovery may be had under a policy of insurance,
and that the loss be proximately caused by a peril
insured against. . . . In insurance cases the
concern is only with the nature of the injury and
how it happened.
. . .
In other words, in
determining causable loss for the purpose of
fixing insurance liability when concurring causes
of
damage
appear,
the
proximate
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cause to which the loss is to be attributed is or
may be the dominant or the efficient cause — the
one that sets the others in motion — although other
incidental causes may be nearer in time to the
result and may operate more immediately in
producing the loss."
In

the

present

case

the

dominant

or

efficient

cause — t h e one that set the other in motion—was the sub-surface
water.

Without the sub-surface water, respondent would not have

had to hire a contractor to excavate around her home for the
purpose

of

resolving

the

problems

caused

by

the

sub-surface

water.
As is clearly and unambiguously stated in respondent's
limited risk homeowner's insurance policy, that policy does not
insure against loss caused by, resulting from, contributing to or
aggravated by water below the surface of the ground.

In his

affidavit, Arnold W. Coon, a structural engineer, stated that in
his opinion the failure of the foundation walls of respondent's
home was caused by, resulted from, contributed to, or aggravated
by water below the surface of the ground.
In the Graham case, supra, the mud flow which destroyed
appellant's home in that case would not have occurred without the
eruption of Mt. St. Helens.

Graham, 656 P.2d at 1081.

In the instant case, the excavation around respondent's
home

would

not

have

occurred

without

the

sub-surface water around respondent's home.
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existence

of

the

Even if this Court finds it necassary to resolve this
case based upon an inquiry

on the issue of causation, it is

respectfully

submitted

that such inquiry can only lead to one

conclusion:

that the sub-surface water was the proximate cause

of the loss sustained by respondent.
POINT II
THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY RESPONDENT WAS CAUSED BY,
RESULTED FROM, CONTRIBUTED TO AND WAS AGGRAVATED
BY WATER BELOW THE SURFACE OF THE GROUND.
The parties in their respective briefs have outlined
for this Court the law of interpreting insurance contracts.

The

limited

the

risk

homeowner's

insurance

policy

purchased

by

respondent provides as follows:
"This policy does not insure against loss:
(3)
caused by, resulting from, contributed to, or
aggravated by any of the following:
c.

water below the surface of the ground . . .ff

Based upon the clear and unambiguous language of the
policy and respondent's admission that the sub-surface water was
a contributing cause of the collapse, (respondent's brief, p. 90)
this Court must reverse the trial Court's decision.
CONCLUSION
Despite

respondent's

argument

and

emphasis

on

concept of proximate causation, this is a contract dispute.

the
To

resolve the issues herein, the Court must apply established rules
of interpreting insurance contracts.

The critical lauguage, the

exclusion upon which appellant has relied to deny coverage, is
-4-

clear and unambiguous.

The limited homeowner's insurance policy

purchased by respondent

specifically

excludes

loss caused by,

resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by water below the
surface of the ground.

The evidence an|d respondent's admission,

unequivocally established

that the losis suffered by respondent

was caused by the sub-surface water.
If, however, this Court determines that it is necessary
to resolve this case by examining the issue of causation, it is
respectfully

submitted

that

the

sub+surface

water

was

the

dominant or efficient cause of the collapse of respondent's home.
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested
that this Court reverse the trial court's judgment.
Dated this

->Y

day of June, 1988.
JENSEN, PUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON

Thomas A. Duff in
'//
Attorney for Appellant/
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